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Social licences to operate:  F or better not for worse;  for richer not for 
poorer?  The impacts of unplanned mining closure for ‘fence line’ 
residential communities 
 
Establishing ‘social licences to operate’ with communities has become a 
significant corporate social responsibility agenda. The complex dynamics of 
these relationships can compound the impacts for communities when these 
contracts are not upheld. This article documents reflections from a Rapid Rural 
Appraisal conducted in the Shire of Ravensthorpe in remote Western Australia 
after the Ravensthorpe Nickel Operation was ‘mothballed’ nine months into a 
projected twenty five year life span. It captures how communication about the 
project and its timeframes created a sense of consistency, predictability, 
certainty and trust - enabling the social licence. The raising of hope, and the 
emergence of mistrust underpin the social, environmental and financial impacts 
of this event for the local community. Embedded in the theoretical dimensions 
of social licences this case study highlights the problematic of social licences 
that engage with non-contractual stakeholders as partners in ‘booms’ but have 
no legal responsibility towards them in times of ‘bust’. 
 
Keywords: mining; social licence to operate; corporate social responsibility; 
mine closure; Western Australia 
 
I ntr oduction  
Current business models often emphasise particular strategies of community 
engagement and corporate social responsibility (CSR), which extend the ties between 
businesses and non-contractual stakeholders beyond what is considered normal 
business practice (Kleinrichert, 2008). Such approaches challenge traditional notions 
of rural governance and place companies as main players in the governance of 
regional and remote development (Cheshire, 2010). This is particularly the case 
within the mining industry in Australia. These ‘business-in-community’ approaches 
create a sense of security and certainty in the future, and establish what is known as a 
‘social licence to operate’ within a regional community. What is little recognised are 
the unintended impacts of these increasingly complex social-political-business 
relationships for the local communities in which these social licences are established. 
This is particularly compounded in residential mining models (also known as fence 
line mining where the mining company is a direct neighbour of an already established 
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community) and when obligations and responsibilities of these social contracts are not 
upheld.  
 This paper reflects on a Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) undertaken in a remote 
part of south Western Australia (WA) - the Shire of Ravensthorpe (see Figure 1) - 
after a residential mine, initially established with a strong social licence to operate in 
the region, suspended operations 9 months into a promised 25 year lifespan (Browne, 
Buckley & Stehlik, 2009). The mine was an open cut nickel-cobalt hydroxide mine 
and processing facility called the Ravensthorpe Nickel Operation (RNO; BHP 
Billiton, 2005). Uniquely for a country dominated by long distance commuting such 
as FIFO (Fly-In Fly-Out) to remote mine sites, the RNO was developed as a mixed-
residential model in the remote Shire of Ravensthorpe (herein referred to as ‘the 
Shire’ 1
 By exploring the case study of the suspension of the RNO, in conjunction with 
the theoretical basis of this social licence model, the contributions of this paper are 
three fold. First, the specific focus of this paper is to explore some of the potential 
impacts of closure for place based communities which are relatively dependent on 
development projects to support regional economic stability and growth. This focus 
). What distinguishes this example of closure from the fairly heavily 
documented closure of industry and mining across the United Kingdom and other 
parts of the world (e.g., Clark and Wrigley, 1997; Cloke, Milbourne & Thomas, 1996; 
Haney & Shkaratan, 2003; Rollwagen, 2007; Whitbread-Abrutat, 2004), is the 
complex social-political-business partnerships forged in the establishment phase of 
the mine, compounding the impacts of the mines sudden closure for those in the 
region.  
                                                 
1 The word ‘shire’ is used in Australia, particularly remote parts of Western Australia, to denote an 
administrative region known as a local government area (LGA) managed by local government 
councils. ‘The Shire of Ravensthorpe’, also known simply as ‘The Shire’ by residents reflects the 
administrative LGA and council regions of Ravensthorpe Ward, Hopetoun Ward and Rural Ward 
(including Jerdacuttup).  
 
 
on the range and significance of impacts for non-contractual stakeholders is important 
as the majority of research currently captures impacts of mine suspension and closure 
for formal shareholders, stakeholders, employees and the company involved. That the 
social, financial, and environmental investments required from the community for 
residential and other mining models are still not included as a final part of the 
negotiation of this social licence to operate and general calculation of project costs, 
including the eventuality of unplanned closure, needs exploring.  
Second, current approaches to mining and industrial closure generally focus 
on the processes for planned closure (e.g., ANZMEC, 2000; Blackman et al, 2009; 
ICMM, 2008; World Bank Group, 2002), with forecasting, planning and 
communication strategies for sudden suspension or closure notably absent. Given the 
reactivity and volatility of many resource based industries to the financial markets 
(MMSD, 2002), this paper highlights the need for adopting a more comprehensive 
approach to planning for different types of closure. That a precautionary approach and 
planning for multiple types of closure when establishing social licences to operate 
with communities is not adopted worldwide is surprising, particularly given this is 
increasingly supported by international organisations (e.g., Pellizzoni & Ylönen, 
2008; UNEP, 2005).  
Such planning is particularly important in times of economic uncertainty as it 
has been identified that at these times unplanned and premature closure of mining 
sites is escalated (Blackman et al, 2009). In the period between 1980 to 2006 the 
maximum number of mines to close in any one year worldwide was approximately 50 
(Blackman et al, 2009; Laurence, 2009). In 2008-2009, 120 mines closed 
prematurely, double the amount in the previous 26 years. (Blackman et al, 2009; 
Laurence, 2009). In an analysis of over 1000 closures Laurence (2006, 2009, 2011) 
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found that in the 30 year period between 1981 and 2009 around 75% of the mines that 
closed were unplanned or premature. This highlights the significance of the current 
case study of Ravensthorpe as there is a worldwide pattern of unplanned and early 
closure of mine sites, with little done to prepare communities or other stakeholders for 
the uncertainty that characterises resource industries. 
Finally, uncertainty (which is of course both internal and external to 
organisations) is a common feature of business development, success and failure. 
However, what is often communicated to communities to guarantee buy-in is 
certainty and an escalated expectation of the benefits to be derived from the projects 
(Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius & Rothengatter, 2003). This is significant in Australia where 
there is a reliance on market mechanisms to provide social, environmental and 
economic good (particularly throughout remote and regional Australia; see Cheshire 
2006, 2010). In such political and economic circumstances there is often pressure for 
regional communities to legitimise a company’s presence by buying-in to a social 
contract that promises significant social and economic benefits that are difficult to 
access through any other mechanism. In such instances the communication of 
certainties rather than probably uncertainties and risks in the establishment of social 
licences should be questioned. 
T he context of fence line mining in Australia 
During the gold rush and other mining booms in Australia many residential towns 
were established - a term which defines where mining workers and other residents 
live in situ in the local government area (LGA) where the mine operates (Haslam 
McKenzie et al, 2009; Yakovleva, 2005). These are also known as ‘fence line’ 
communities (Calvano, 2008). Many rural Australian towns can be traced back to 
such a history (Davison, 2005). Australia also has a fairly long history of occupational 
 
 
mining communities; permanent townships established exclusively for mine 
employees and other related workers (Haslam McKenzie et al, 2009; Yakovleva, 
2005). However, since the 1980s models of long distance commuting such as FIFO 
and more recently Drive-In Drive-Out (DIDO) have become the preferred options 
(Chamber of Minerals and Energy, 2005; Storey, 2001). In this approach companies 
fly (or drive) workers from their residence, most often a costal urban city, to the mine 
site and settlement (Storey, 2001). FIFO and occupational communities have been 
shown to make particular economic sense for mines in geographically isolated 
regions, for sites that have a short life span and in regions where there is a shortage of 
skilled labour (Storey, 2001). 
 Due to the expense of establishing and maintaining residential mining 
communities there are only a small number still in operation within Australia, most of 
which have existed since the 1960s (Chamber of Minerals and Energy, 2005; Storey, 
2001). Unusually the RNO was proposed at a time when few residential mines were 
in operation or being established. Residential mining communities strongly rely on 
the (social, cultural, and economic) capital and investment of non-contractual 
stakeholder relationships of people in the local community, of multiple scales of 
government 2
T he R avensthorpe Nickel Operation and the history of ‘ T he Shire’  
 and any interest groups.  
The remote Shire of Ravensthorpe is located WA 536km south east of Perth, 186km 
west of Esperance and 293km east of Albany (Government of Western Australia, 
2009; see Figure 1). The farming in the region is largely cropping and grazing. As is 
common with many rural communities in Australia Ravensthorpe’s mining history 
records a series of boom and bust cycles. The Shire has a history as a gold and copper 
                                                 
2 Australia has a three tired government system – local, state and federal governments who are 
variously responsible for service delivery and infrastructural development in remote regions.  
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mining town and some of the agricultural land was opened up for mining during the 
1960s and 1970s (Ravensthorpe Shire, 2009; Mayes & Haslam McKenzie, 2008).  
Physically, the Shire consists of the main drive-through highway town of 
Ravensthorpe, the Jerdacuttup farming community some 35 kms from Ravensthorpe, 
and a small community by the sea, Hopetoun, some 50 kms south of Ravensthorpe 
(see Figure 1). The Shire also contains a UNESCO listed biodiversity hotspot, the 
Fitzgerald River National Park. The RNO is located within the small farming district 
of Jerdacuttup on Bandalup Hill (Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, 
2006). The Jerdacuttup community is therefore the RNO’s closest fence line 
neighbour.  
 Pre-feasibility studies for the RNO had commenced in 2002 (BHP Billiton, 
2005; DITR, 2006) with negotiations with local, State and Federal governments from 
2000 (Australian Mining, 2006). The RNO was formally approved in March 2004 
(BHP Billiton, 2008a). This came with agreements of contributions from the WA 
State Government ($18m), Federal Government ($9.8m) and BHP Billiton ($9.5m) to 
develop multi-user and socially relevant infrastructure, such as schools, housing, 
entertainments centres, an airport and roads contingent on the workforce being 
residential (Australian Mining, 2006; BHP Billiton, 2009c; Department of Industry, 
Tourism and Resources, 2006; Department of Industry and Resources, 2008). Given 
the range of mining and multi-user infrastructure investments, the RNO has been 
reported as the biggest investment in BHP Billiton’s history (Australian Mining, 
2006). The cost of establishing the mine was quoted as double the original budget 
allocated (Klinger, 2009).3
                                                 




BHP Billiton had committed to a locally based residential workforce with the 
majority of employees being housed in settlements built in Hopetoun (BHP Billiton, 
2004a; BHP Billiton, 2005). At that time, the residential workforce directly employed 
by BHP Billiton was estimated at 300 workers (plus families), with hundreds more to 
be indirectly employed on the project (BHP Billiton, 2004a). A more hybrid strategy 
of residential and commuting workers was eventually adopted. Residential workers 
were based in both Ravensthorpe and Hopetoun, a bus-in/bus-out system established 
from Esperance and, following the extension of the Ravensthorpe airport, a FIFO 
system from Perth (BHP Billiton 2008b). The RNO was officially opened in May 
2008 (BHP Billiton, 2008a). 
As at mid-2008, the estimated long-term locally based residential workforce 
stood at 650 people (plus families), with more than 300 families reportedly resident in 
the community, and an estimated 450 families moving into the Region by the end of 
2008 (Department of Industry and Resources, 2008). Related to this increase in the 
residential mining community the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) population 
growth statistics reported Ravensthorpe as the LGA with the fastest increases in 
growth per percentage of population across the whole of Australia (including urban 
Australia) in 2006-2007 (ABS, 2008a). Although growth had slowed marginally in 
2007-2008 (from 10.8 per cent growth in 2006-2007 to 9.1 per cent growth in 2007-
2008), Ravensthorpe was still identified as the second fastest growing LGA across the 
whole of Australia, just below that of the Perth metropolitan area (ABS, 2009).  
Much of the RNO’s promotional material cited the mine would be productive 
for 25 years (BHP Billiton, 2004b). Indeed, the expected mine life of RNO was 
quoted at 21 years in October 2008 (BHP Billiton 2008b), five months after it opened 
and only three months before operations were suspended. The decision to ‘ramp-
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down’ and indefinitely suspend activities at the RNO was publicly announced on 21st 
January 2009 through the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) (BHP Billiton, 2009a, 
2009b)4
Although it is not the place nor intent of this article to infer the true cause of 
the closure (as this will never be known except to those involved in the management 
of the mine), media coverage and community sentiment at the time indicated that 
there were other reasons for the suspension of RNO. For example, the nickel price at 
its suspension was equivalent to the price when the project was initially scoped and 
recommended for development. Other difficulties referred to were problems with the 
type of operating systems used for this type of processing facility.                                                                                                
. It was the first mine in Australia to announce a suspension to operations 
following the global financial crisis in 2008, citing the financial crisis and a rapidly 
falling nickel price. It echoed reports of cuts to jobs and closures of mines as a result 
of the economic downturn worldwide (James, 2009). RNO staff members were 
notified at an onsite meeting held that morning (BHP Billiton, 2009a, 2009b). The 
RNO has since been cited by financial analysts as mostly responsible for BHP 
Billiton’s $US1.5 billion after-tax first-half write-down in 2008 (Chambers, 2009a). 
Subsequent to this announcement, it has been reported that 1800 RNO employees and 
contractors were dismissed (Tasker, 2009). This includes both the 300+ employees 
directly employed by BHP Billiton (Department of Industry and Resources, 2008) and 
others indirectly employed, for example, as contractors to the RNO.  
E stablishing a R apid R ur al A ppr aisal M ethodology to A ssess the C losur e of 
R NO  
                                                 
4 BHP Billiton suspended operations at the RNO nearly a year until a decision was announced by the 
company as to its future and the site was offered for sale. The RNO was finally sold to First Quantum 
for $US430 million, and it is suggested that the RNO will re-open mid-2011(Chambers, 2009b). The 
reflections of the impacts for the community in this article are based on research conducted in the year 
following the mines suspension, and prior to its sale to another resource company.  
 
 
It was at this time that the authors decided to conduct a RRA to follow on from 
research they and other colleagues had conducted in the region from 2005. RRA is a 
survey methodology conducted to capture insights from a purposeful sample of 
participants on a particular issue within a specific context (Dunn, 1994). As Dunn 
argues, this approach reveals relevant information more quickly than traditional 
research methodologies, and enables researchers to interpret responses and transform 
local knowledge to inform development options. Given the experience of the 
researchers with issues in this region, and the need to adopt a methodology that 
responded to the suddenness of the closure, it was decided that this was an appropriate 
methodology. The approach provided an opportunity for local people to discuss and 
describe their awareness and reactions to, as many called it, the ‘mothballing’ of 
RNO; as well as to capture their aspirational views for the future in light of the 
changes to lifestyles and livelihoods (McCraken, Pretty & Conway, 1988).  
The research consisted of a semi-structured interview questionnaire with 
members of the local community (local businesses, community leaders, community 
researchers from previous stages of research, education professionals, local 
government representatives, community groups and volunteers), and a forum with 
farmers from Jerdacuttup, the area directly next to the mine site. Both the semi-
structured interview and the farmers forum captured the participants perceptions of 
the processes of closure; a general discussion about the short term and longer term 
consequences of the closure for their families, businesses, communities and the shire; 
and a more general discussion about wider consequences such as environmental, 
regional and state impacts.  
The semi-structured interview went into greater depth about participants 
perceptions of the company across the lifespan of its operation in the community, 
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addressing key issues that underpin the concept of ‘social licenses’. For example one 
question asked participants to assess the lifespan of RNO operation and whether it i) 
created a sense of reliability about its operations ii) showed concern for the 
community iii) provided avenues for open communication and information sharing 
and iv) displayed accountability in its decisions. A question was also asked about 
their acceptance of the original timeframes suggested by the company. These and 
other questions were used to establish the general perceptions and impacts of the 
closure, as well as trying to verify quantitatively (albeit retrospectively) how 
committed people were to the social license the company established in their region. 
For specific detail of the analysis of the questionnaire please refer to the project report 
written by Browne et al (2009).  
Due to the residential nature of the mine, rather than focusing on mine-related 
employees, a whole-of-community approach to sampling was adopted. Using a local 
research facilitator to co-ordinate both the interviews and the farmers’ forum a 
purposive sampling structure was adopted. Out of 138 invitations issued and a local 
media campaign (local and state radio interviews and newspaper articles informing 
about the project and asking for participants), 41 people participated in the survey 
interview and 24 in the farmers’ forum. In a regional community in a state of flux 
with an already small population, this was seen to be a successful response rate 
particularly for a RRA which does not attempt a statistically valid sample but seeks to 
reveal contextually based and relevant information rigorously but quickly.  
Data from the survey was analysed using SPSS, and NIVO software was used 
for the qualitative survey questions and the three researchers’ field notes and farmers’ 
forum notes. A content analysis of national media articles gathered through Factiva 
between June 2008 and the end of the project in December 2009 was undertaken as 
 
 
well as a review of local and regional media not captured through the database (e.g., 
the local paper ‘Community Spirit’), existing literature, reports and studies in the 
Region and Shire. As government and business documents about the closure of the 
mine were often not available, media reports and interviews conducted with the key 
stakeholders in the community were used as supplementary evidence.  
T he Significance of a Social L icence to Oper ate in ‘ F ence L ine’  M ining  
Major resource and infrastructure developments in Australia are now regularly 
implemented in a model of business-in-community (Lonzano et al, 2008). This 
approach focuses on core business investments in combination with strategic social 
investments to address specific agendas for community and regional development 
(Reed & Reed, 2009; UN Global Compact, 2007). Socially relevant investments take 
many forms from using public involvement as a competitive edge for marketing, to a 
model where organisations partner with communities with a focus on establishing a 
social licence to operate within a community setting (Burke, 1999; Lozano et al., 
2008). Engagements with non-contractual stakeholders include local neighbourhoods 
and communities, civil society organisations, and interest groups, local governments 
and national governments (Usui, 2006). Legally binding contracts rarely exist with 
these stakeholders but instead individual and group psychological/social contracts are 
formed creating the basis of this social licence (Global Mining, 2002).  
 These contracts can be established at the individual level reflecting an 
individual’s belief about the terms of the relationship with another party, and at a 
group level (called a normative psychological contract) where members of a social 
unit (such as a local community) share a similar set of psychological contracts with 
another party (such as a business or organisation) (Rousseau, 1998). A social licence 
to operate, often also known as a normative psychological contract (Global Mining, 
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2002) is a “perception of an exchange agreement between oneself and another 
party....The perception of mutuality, not necessarily mutuality in fact is the heart of 
the psychological contract” (Rousseau, 1998, pp. 665-666, italics in original). It is not 
a specific, formal contract but a social tie extending normal business practice or 
courtesy to ensure a feeling of security (Kleinrichert, 2008). It is based on a notion of 
a diffuse, generalised obligation of reciprocity and exchange (Kleinrichert, 2008), of 
which of course there can be numerous interpretations and perceptions and from 
which conflict can arise as a result of divergent opinions about what the social license 
means. The term social licence reflects a diffuse type of legitimacy not supported 
through any contractual obligation, either ethical or legal. 
A social licence enhances the reputation and acceptance of a company into a 
community through the establishment of relationships based on feelings of trust and 
reciprocity (Burke, 1999; Stehlik, 2005). This reputation is built on ‘intangibles’ such 
as “trust, reliability, quality, consistency, credibility, relationship, transparency” 
(Cowe & Hopkins, 2008, p. 102). This extends a company to being considered a 
‘supplier of choice’, ‘employer of choice’ and particularly relevant for residential 
mining, a ‘neighbour of choice’ (Buckley, 2009; Burke). It creates a legitimised 
atmosphere of consent for the presence of a company in a community.  
 However, despite the need to establish both contractual and non-contractual 
relationships (Calvano, 2008; Mason & O’Mahony, 2008) in order to establish a 
residential mine, consequences of early suspension or closure for the non-contractual 
stakeholders are not well documented, nor well understood (Cheshire, 2010; 
CHOCILCO, 2002; Weyzig, 2009). This is because although community is often 
defined as one of the major stakeholders of mining activities (Yakovleva, 2005), 
ultimate responsibility lies with the shareholders and contractual stakeholders 
 
 
(Kolstad, 2007; Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997). This is the case particularly ‘when 
times are tough’ and corporations fall back to traditional corporate governance where 
the overriding responsibility is to maximise shareholder returns (Mason & 
O’Mahony, 2008). Some authors even suggest that the social responsibility in 
business is always to increase profits and CSR is simply a form of investment and a 
public relations exercise for corporations (e.g., Friedman, 2008; Kolstad, 2007; Reed 
& Reed, 2009; Zammit, 2003).  
 Local and place based communities are now often the sites in which 
multinational and other types of project development (and failure) become contested 
(Calvano, 2008). In the absence of formal contracts, there is no tangible, legally or 
ethically defined obligation to a community despite the establishment of a social 
licence to operate. As a result, economically and psychologically, many of the true 
costs of the closure and the breaking of the community-corporate relationship are 
borne by the community (McNulty, 1987). This inadequate calculation of the true 
costs of mining investment and closure reflects the power differentials between 
corporate and community stakeholders, with the former having more control and 
influence, more options, and more resources to set the conditions with which they 
engage in, and retreat from CSR activities (Cheshire, 2010; Kleinrichert, 2008; Reed 
& Reed, 2009). Establishing residential mining communities, or any other place based 
initiative which relies on the establishment of a social licences to operate, reflects a 
‘grey area’ of obligation definition for corporations and challenges current 
conceptualisations of corporate responsibility and accountability to non-contractual 
stakeholders. It invokes a diffuse set of rights not so easily defined or defended as the 
ethical and legal rights bound in formal contracts and permissions. As Cheshire 
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(2010) suggests it can even be considered an intervention which redefines the role of 
governance and the state.  
Under standing I mpacts in a Declining R ur al A ustr alia:  T he Politics of H ope and 
M istr ust 
Over the past few decades many rural and remote areas of Australia have faced a 
‘rural decline’ due to factors such as a changing climate and increased drought, an 
ageing farming population, falling export prices and the restructuring of more 
innovative (and often commercial scale) farming industries in many areas where 
traditional cropping and grazing are no longer financially viable (e.g., Lawrence & 
Gray, 2000). Compounding the grave problems of environmental fragility across 
much of rural Australia, is a general shift towards neoliberal governance where the 
support for rural communities has strongly diminished (Cheshire, 2006; Cocklin & 
Dibden, 2005). Although experienced differently across rural Australia, the net effect 
has been one of reduced income and employment opportunities, a loss of services, and 
a range of other social and economic impacts to the regions (Hugo, 2005).  
Altered aspirations 
RNO gained traction and a social licence to operate based on the hope instilled in the 
community regarding what this development would bring to the region for the next 
20-30 years. This hope was not about community greed, but raising the standard of 
living and income generation in the community to that which is experienced and 
expected by the rest of (urban) WA. For example, the establishment phase of the 
RNO doubled the income levels of the Shire (Buckley & Stehlik, 2008), even though 
income levels still remained below the average of the state (ABS, 2008b, 2008c). The 
hope attached to large-scale and long-term mining development such as that 
represented by RNO, particularly economic and social stability for the communities, 
 
 
and the promise of employment for the younger generation of residents involved is 
significant. In fact, some researchers propose that trust in business-community 
relationships is developed and characterised by such hope, optimism and expectation 
(White-Cooper et al, 2009).  
RRA participants identified positive impacts of the mine including a 
significant population increase, maintenance and attraction of younger people (back) 
to the region, higher incomes and greater cash flow in the community, infrastructure 
improvements, social and recreational activities enhanced, and business opportunities. 
This reflects what is termed the multiplier effect of mining investments (McNulty, 
1987). Both short and long-term residents identified being ‘more conscious’ of 
lifestyle choices available to them as a result of the opening of the mine.  
Far from being simply a patronage model where the company provides funds 
for activities and infrastructures for the region (Cheshire, 2010), the establishment of 
the RNO reflected a deeper engagement with the self-determining aspects of regional 
development, and empowerment to create opportunities for a brighter future for the 
Shire as a result of the social contracts established with the mining company. We 
reflect on this as an ‘altered aspirational’ dimension to individual and the community 
development as a result of these social contracts. For example, before the opening of 
RNO, in order to prepare for the expected influx of new employees and their families, 
business initiatives in the Region were actively encouraged. The company financially 
supported the ‘start-up’ of a number of businesses in order to provide local goods and 
services for large contractors from outside the Region, and the expanding residential 
mining community (BHP Billiton, 2009c; Burrell, 2009; Department of Industry, 
Tourism and Resources, 2006) and it also attracted a number of other entrepreneurs to 
establish businesses in both Hopetoun and Ravensthorpe townships.  
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There were a range of social and economic impacts associated with this 
change in aspiration and expectation. There were direct financial and economic 
considerations for families and businesses, and at a regional level losing this 
aspirational potential was reason enough for some to leave the community, with 
others expressing concern that the pre-mine population may also decline. The out-
migration of younger people, who were staying for the opportunities afforded by the 
mine, as well as the loss of small business operators, was seen to be directly linked to 
the now reduced opportunities in the Shire.  
Variations also existed in the impacts and issues for Ravensthorpe, Hopetoun 
and Jerdacutup townships. Hopetoun and Ravensthorpe businesses; people employed 
as contract workers by RNO or BHP Billiton; school children; homeowners; and 
people directly employed by RNO were all identified by survey participants as being 
significantly impacted groups (Browne et al, 2009). Hopetoun businesses were seen 
as significantly affected by the closure of the RNO, as it was in this area that 
businesses were particularly encouraged in order to service the increasing residential 
population in that town (BHP Billiton, 2009c). Other issues raised specific to 
Hopetoun were: a glut of newly vacant housing impacting the housing market and 
equity in housing; lack of childcare; loss of community vitality; and loss of sporting 
groups and other community associations due to population decline. Ravensthorpe 
businesses, while identified as bearing some of the impact, were considered less 
impacted than Hopetoun businesses. A number of respondents noted the impact on 
housing prices and infrastructure in the region, with homeowners being identified as 
one of the most affected groups within the Shire.  
The economic impact on the contractors and small to medium enterprise 
businesses had a resultant impact on the decline of infrastructure, services and social 
 
 
services in the region. There was a particularly strong concern expressed during the 
study regarding the future of health services, with the only doctor leaving town post-
closure, and the single pharmacist in Ravensthorpe also considering closing his 
business. This concern for a future lack of health care services was exacerbated by the 
large distances between the Shire and other major regional centres that have health 
care services (with the nearest medical treatment 1.5 - 2.5 hours away in Esperance or 
Albany).                                                                                                  
T he communication of certainty in the establishment of social licences 
It was reported by participants that in its initial negotiations with the community the 
mines lifespan in the region was communicated with absolute certainty, creating 
psychological contracts based on the longevity of the relationship that it would have 
with that community. They did not communicate their expert knowledge of the known 
and recorded volatility of the resource markets (MMSD, 2002), particularly nickel; 
they also did not communicate the necessarily experimental nature of the mining 
operation and processing methods; and nor did they communicate that there was any 
likelihood that RNO would suspend operations at any early stage. The certainty in this 
long-term relationship with RNO, and the social/cultural/financial investments of 
people in the community based on this certainty is reflected in these comments by a 
local businessman during his interview: BHP said ‘ we will be here for 25 years’ . They 
didn’ t say ‘ there is a possibility we might not be here for 25 years’ . They sold the 
message ‘ commit because we are committed’ . 
 Cheshire (2010) has cautioned how current governance modes of CSR in 
mining can foster dependency and belief that the mine will always be there to provide.  
While this is certainly true in many cases it could also be argued that these business-
in-community partnerships also trade on the sense of dependency and certainty in the 
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role that they will provide in short term and long term governance of the region in 
order to establish the atmosphere that enables the social licence to operate. Such 
social licences also trade on the myopia of risk and the generalised difficulty of people 
to accurately predict things around them, and make accurate risk assessments and 
judgements of the future. That is, the communication of certainty of the longevity of 
the mine possibly compounded the inexperience of the community in these sorts of 
negotiations, and gave them an illusion of security of the social contract with the 
company. From a risk assessment approach accounting for the certainty of failure 
involves planning for various types of impact from various types of risk, including the 
possibility of sudden and planned for closure, and a provision of mechanisms to 
ensure accountability and responsibility at various scales of governance (Flyvbjerg et 
al, 2003). However, not all partners of a social licence are party to this type of 
sophisticated risk based and planning knowledge.  
 Predictability and consistency is generally seen to be a factor that reduces 
perceived levels of threat, and results in a greater sense of safety about another’s 
behaviour (Vodicka, 2006). The majority of respondents (80%) in the RRA indicated 
that the RNO was consistent in its behaviour and created a sense of reliability about 
its operation across the lifespan of its investment in the Region. This consistency and 
commitment, and the communication of certainty, explains the trust and belief people 
had in the time frames given to them and how it was not generally perceived as a 
‘threat’ that the mine might not have a long life. The majority of those involved in our 
research in the region believed, or strongly believed the time frames that they 
understood to be promoted by RNO (Browne et al, 2009). There was the perception of 
a mutual agreement between the community and the company of the time frames of 
the mines operation (Rousseau, 1998).  
 
 
Reflecting on the nature of the relationship with RNO since the announcement 
of the mine’s closure, one participant in their interview said: “We had been courted by 
BHP for years, for it to then become like a quick one night stand” . Another 
participant at the farmers’ forum described the influence that the company has had on 
the community as similar to: “…the ripple effect of being on a water bed, and a big 
giant comes and sits on the bed with you, and then it sits there for a little while and 
things settle down, until the giant just quickly stands up and leaves and the bed moves 
violently again” . 
Another participant described what occurred as “ a loss of expectation” . 
However, research has consistently demonstrated that a violation of a psychological 
contract is very different from just a set an unmet expectations (Rousseau, 1998). 
Breaking psychological contracts provokes a much more serious and intense set of 
(negative) responses than just unmet expectation as there was a greater reliance on the 
losses that were felt due to the unfulfilled contract terms (Rousseau, see also 
Robinson & Rousseau, 1994; Robinson et al, 1994; Rousseau, 1995). The unfulfilled 
contract terms in the case of RNO, was that the length of the BHPs operation of the 
mine reduced to 9 months compared with the 20-30 years agreed to within their social 
licence to operate and cited as 21 years only three months before its closure (BHP 
Billiton 2008b). The impacts for the community are related to the loss of the ability to 
capitalise on the social, environmental and financial investments made by individuals, 
families, businesses, the community and various levels of government to secure a 
more stable regional future based on this perceived agreement.  
Although the company demonstrated certainty, predictability and consistency 
in its communication strategies, interview participants reflected upon the difficulty of 
open and transparent communication with RNO across its lifespan. This perceived 
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lack of open and transparent communication became a (negative) feature of the 
communication of the announcement of the mine’s closure. Many participants called 
for the need for earlier, clearer and more honest communication to the workers, 
businesses and the community about plans for the RNO operation and suspension.  
Trust is embedded in the unspoken assumptions that underpin normal 
communication: that a speaker is being truthful, sincere, genuine, and appropriate in 
what they say (Reynolds & Yuthas, 2008). As previously highlighted these 
assumptions were reinforced by the consistency of the corporate message that the 
mine would be there for 25 years. The establishment of the RNO marked the first time 
that many in the community had negotiated a social licence as part of such a large 
investment. On reflection of the process many participants in the RRA identified that 
they felt that they were without the social and financial capital to negotiate the CSR 
initiative to their benefit in the same degree that RNO could negotiate. This involved 
both knowledge of the right sorts of questions to ask, belief in the consistent messages 
that were coming regarding the life time of the mine, and also the inability to pay for 
legal advice that matched that of the RNO. This echos reflections by Flyvbjerg and 
others whose research focuses on the ‘mega-project paradox’ and explores examples 
of the increasing underperformance of largely urban infrastructure projects to deal 
with increasingly complex human needs, and the miscalculated and unintended 
economic, social and environmental costs of such projects (e.g., Altshuler & 
Luberoff, 2003; Brousseau, 2008; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2005; Miller and 
Lessard, 2000; Priemus, Flyvbjerg & van Wee, 2008; van Marrewijk et al., 2008).  
Although obviously there are different experiences and impacts between urban 
and rural developments, as a theoretical parallel, the mega-projects paradox literature 
touches on the idea of a ‘politics of mistrust’. This politics of mistrust is where the 
 
 
history of failure of project development results in community and non-contractual 
stakeholder scepticism regarding large scale infrastructure projects (Flyvbjerg et al, 
2003)5
While in retrospect, it could be seen that there were some elements of mistrust 
in sections of the community during the start-up and construction phase, the strength 
of the ‘politics of hope’ overcame this mistrust at a community level. The 
development of mistrust after the mine was mothballed reflects a situation where 
communities begin to understand that in their communication in or with corporations, 
the politics of trust that underpin most other rational communications cannot be taken 
for granted (Reynolds & Yuthas, 2008). This is compounded by the realisation that 
there is a political inequity underpinning these psychological contracts, and that a lack 
of community access to decision making processes results in the unequal distribution 
. The illusion of consent created when establishing a social license to operate 
also applies to the withdrawal of this consent by the community, when the true nature 
of the license (and lack of responsibility and reciprocity) is exposed and communities 
increasingly try to redefine the license and the boundaries of operation of the current 
and future companies. For example, although there was not strong support for BHP 
Billiton re-opening the RNO, there was strong support in the community for other 
mining companies (preferably junior mining companies) re-establishing the mine and 
investing in other mining ventures in the region. There was a withdrawal of the 
consent for the social licence to operate with BHP Billiton and a redefinition of the 
boundaries of consent that would be granted in the future when considering the 
possibility of other mining ventures.  
                                                 
5 Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter (2003) describe in great detail alternative ways of dealing with 
risks involved with resource development. There are ‘choices’ even when there appears to be none 
available—choices of transparency and effective communication, choices regarding levels of 
responsibility and accountability. Sensibly, the suggest that these choices provide much better 
corporate strategies for companies involved in such large resource developments (Flyvbjerg et al, 
2003) than the negative publicity received when engaged in corporate practices such as that observed 
in the case study example.  
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of risks, costs, and benefits (Crouch, 2004; Crouch & Streeck, 2006; Flyvbjerg et al, 
2003; Reed & Reed, 2009; Reynolds and Yuthas, 2008). Such mistrust developed 
over time which will become obvious in the next section exploring the myths around 
environmental management that emerged after the mine was suspended on January 
2009. 
Understanding place based impacts as environmental change:  Solastalgia, risks 
and myths 
The natural environment is considered a major attractor of, and valuable asset to, the 
region by local residents (Stehlik et al, 2008) and issues related to the environment 
remain of importance to the Shire (Browne et al, 2009). A range of environmental 
impacts were identified as a result of the mine closure, and these included both 
positive and negative impacts resulting from population decline and less financial 
investment in the region. An important issue is the degree of environmental change in 
the Shire as a result of the mine such as increased pressure on a fragile environment 
due to an increased population and an increased international focus on the UNESCO 
biosphere. A number of respondents discussed potential positive environmental 
impacts from reduced mine activity such as less stress on the environment and 
beaches due to a reduced population. A significant concern for some in the region was 
the effectiveness of the ongoing environmental management of the ‘mothballed’ site, 
which sits amongst national parks and close to the UNESCO listed biodiversity 
hotspot. 
Issues of environmental change intersect with the discussion of psychological 
contracts and non-contractual investments in this case study. The social and 
environmental investments and sacrifices made in establishing a psychological 
contract with a mine with a projected life of 25 years had a negative outcome, 
 
 
particularly for the direct fence line neighbour of the mine the farming community of 
Jerdacuttup. It was a consistent theme in the study, particularly for the people in 
Jerdacuttup, that the mine decimated much of Bandalup Hill (see figure 1), a major 
landscape feature for the surrounding farms, from which the ore was being mined. 
With many local farmers having sold all or part of their farms for the mine, this 
environmental legacy left people remembering the physical and social landscape ‘the 
way that it used to be’.  
In the face of profound environmental change people can feel great distress 
and a nostalgia for ‘the way things were’, even though they may still be in the same 
physical location or home environment. Albrecht uses the term ‘solastalgia’ – “the 
loss of or inability to derive solace from, the present state of one’s home 
environment” (Albrecht, 2006, p. 35; Albrecht et al, 2007) to characterise this feeling. 
In the case of the Jerdacuttup community there has been both a loss of the natural 
environment (and the historic relationship with the natural environment of these 
farmers) and a loss of relationships with local people who historically have been a 
part of that environment. In the context of the suspension of the mine only 9 months 
after it had opened feelings reflecting this concept of solastalgia were high in the 
fence line farming community.  
It is often forgotten that a mine has a very physical presence, which can have 
many interpretations; it has physical “landscapes of a particular kind; ones that the 
best practices of closure will find hard to erase. Mines are not merely extracting 
minerals, but are also marking time and space with their appearances” (Halvaksz, 
2008, p. 21). The Shire is marked with the many failed experimental mines which dot 
the landscape, and previously closed down sites which are remembered in the visible 
scars of the tailings mounds left behind on the landscape (see Brierley, 2010; Collier 
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& Scott, 2009). Perhaps another stagnant mine, as the social and economic futures of 
the region remained uncertain at the time of the RRA, was a stark physical reminder 
of the physical and social sacrifice that was made in granting this social licence to 
operate to the RNO.  
As a result of the closure, issues (as well as some confusion regarding legal 
responsibilities) of the environmental rehabilitation of the RNO site gathered 
increasing attention in the media (e.g., Banks, 2009) as well as in the broader 
community. Identified as a particular concern at the farmers’ forum, and in a number 
of other interviews, the RRA study identified that the local environment around the 
mine site was viewed by the community as a potential physical health risk, and a 
source of stress and concern. There was concern regarding the care and maintenance 
of the site after it had been mothballed. There were also substantial ‘myths’ operating 
in the community regarding potential asbestos fibres (white mineral fibres) in the ore 
body and about the health risks and long-term issues related to managing dust drift  
(which was thought to potentially contain these fibres) from the mine into their  
farming community and beyond into Ravensthorpe township.  
Whether there is truth to the risks identified by the community regarding the 
long-term impact on quality of life, livelihoods and health at the closure of this mine 
is not the point. These pervasive community concerns post-closure speak to issues of 
inadequate communication with the community, particularly regarding environmental 
obligation and maintenance post-closure. Therefore, whether true or not the myth 
embodies a truth about the community’s suspicions of environmental risks (e.g., 
Dake, 1992) based on the unfulfilled social licence terms and the development of 
mistrust of the company post-closure.  
 
 
Mining and deindustrialisation should be seen as shaping the landscape and 
social histories of place (Rollwagen, 2007; Jones, 2008; Whitebread-Abrutat, 2004). 
As Halvaksz (2008) suggests where mining is part of the social fabric of the town, it 
becomes a part of the landscapes social history. Although a mining company has left, 
the mining or the prospect for mining still continues as part of the potential regional 
identity and part of the future mix for a more stable economy (Halvaksz, 2008). 
Similarly to Halvaksz’s (2008) reflections of mining closure in Papua New Guinea, 
due to the severity of the impact of the mine on Bandalup Hill and the uncertainty at 
the time of the RRA as to the future of the mine the  
“...closure neither finalizes relations between all resident populations and 
 mined  spaces, nor does it end the desires instilled during the production. Recovered, 
 replanted, and refilled, mines remain important sites for imaginative engagement, for 
 contestation, and for multiple understandings of  their creation and dissolution long 
 after the company has left” (Halvaksz, 2008, p. 29).  
Putting the RNO in ‘mothballs’ was a significant concern and stress for the 
community. As has been mentioned elsewhere, eventually a decision was announced 
that BHP Billiton was to sell the RNO (Chambers, 2009b). However this was not 
before a culture of significant mistrust developed towards the company, the scale of 
the sacrifices that members of the community had made for this social licence with 
the company had been mourned for, and significant fears regarding the 
environmental, social, and economic future of the region were experienced 
uncertainly for nearly a year.  
C onclusion 
This case study of the mothballing of RNO in Western Australia shows how 
companies communicate project certainty to gain traction for a social licence to 
operate in a community, and that the impacts of breaking that licence are significantly 
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felt by, and under-compensated for, those with whom that individual or group 
contract is established. Although this is particularly salient in this example of 
residential mining, these lessons also have applicability in other settings where social 
licences and other CSR initiatives are implemented. From a position of trust and 
belief in the reciprocity of the social contract, a mistrust often develops between 
corporations and communities in projects where there are multiple types of 
contractual and non-contractual stakeholders particularly when contract terms are not 
fulfilled. As much as this is about the access to differential scales of resources, access 
to decision making processes and access to financial power, it is also about decisions 
regarding corporate-community communication and engagement. This politics of 
mistrust occurs frequently in business-in-community approaches. It is developed in 
this example in a remote rural Australian community but is just as likely in an 
impoverished urban neighbourhood, or any community that has never before 
negotiated a social licence.  
 While planned closure gives lead time to discuss the legacies of the project to 
the region and community (e.g., Blackman et al., 2009), the costs of unplanned failure 
are little accounted for. This unjust aspect of social licences is often ignored in the 
business ethics literature (Reed & Reed, 2009). There should be a substantial 
reworking of the concepts of obligations, accountability and responsibility involved in 
social licence initiatives, as corporate social responsibility can easily lapse into 
corporate irresponsibility in the context of stakeholder engagement (Greenwood, 
2007). 
In rural Australia, the impacts of sudden closure go beyond the obvious 
economic impacts (McNulty, 1987) to a fundamental underwriting of hope and 
optimism for a more stable development trajectory for the region, and significant 
 
 
environmental and social losses. It is here that the communication of certainty in these 
social licenses becomes irresponsible. The consistency and predictability of the 
communication with the RNO about the certainty of its timeframes of operations, led 
to a high level of trust in the company, and a diverse range of social, economic and 
environmental investments were made by the individuals and groups in the 
communities based on this perception of open communication, consistency of the 
message and trust.  
Currently the mining industry is being encouraged to consider closure 
planning as a part of their core business, and to consider the ways that the social, 
environmental and economic outcomes of a community are bound to change after 
closure (ICMM, 2008). The planning of closure in a community should acknowledge 
that communities dependent on the mine for socio-economic development will have a 
broader set of risks and benefits from mine operation and closure than communities 
with a broader economic base who are less dependent on the longevity of the mines 
operation (ICMM, 2008). While the rhetoric in the mining industry reflects this need 
for planning, in practice, companies and governments find legitimacy for their actions 
by relying on the economic aspects of business decisions, with the intricate social and 
political implications banished from corporate discourse and effectively ignored, 
particularly in times of economic uncertainty (Judge & Dickson, 1987). Similarly, 
while planned for closure does feature regularly in mining industry literature, 
mechanisms for dealing with the impacts of unplanned closure irregularly feature. 
What is needed is long term planning for uncertainty, with features of high 
trust democratic processes, and “hard-nosed considerations about risk and democratic 
accountability” (Flyvbjerg et al, 2003, p. 10). This is particularly significant in an era 
where CSR is becoming the practice norm, and communities who are engaged in the 
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‘boom times’ as partners, in definition as non-contractual stakeholders can be 
dispensed with in times of ‘bust’. What is also significant is that the past 30 years has 
shown that more than 75 % of mine closure is unplanned and that in times of 
economic instability the incidence of unplanned closure more than doubles (Laurence, 
2006, 2011). In the face of sudden closure, non-contractual social, psychological, 
economic and environmental sacrifices and investments represent an unaccounted for 
cost from the failure of resource development. It is concerning that in a society 
increasingly defined by uncertainty and risks (environmental, social, political, 
economic) that these matters are not taken into account in project planning, and that 
adequate insurance for communities engaged in such social licences is not provided.  
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Figure 1. Map of Ravensthorpe-Hopetoun District in Western Australia  
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